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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brittany Acuna appeals from the restitution order that was entered after
her guilty plea to misdemeanor battery. Acuna contends that the state breached
the plea agreement by submitting a restitution claim on behalf of the State
Insurance Fund.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
On August 30, 2010, Officer Brown of the Pocatello Police Department
responded to a call regarding a physical altercation between a male and a
female at an apartment.

(R., p.79.)

When Officer Brown arrived at the

apartment, he was met outside by Christopher Bishop. (ld.) Mr. Bishop reported
that his ex-girlfriend Brittany Acuna had battered him in the apartment and she
fled the area on foot. (ld.) Officer Brown went into the apartment to speak with
Mr. Bishop about the incident and while they were in the apartment, Acuna
walked in. (ld.) Officer Brown asked Acuna to step outside with him, but she
refused. (ld.) Officer Brown asked Acuna again to exit the apartment and she
stepped "just outside the front door." (Id.) Officer Brown did not want Acuna to
be "within ear shot or visual range" of the victim during the investigation so he
asked Acuna "several times" to walk downstairs with him. (Id.) Acuna refused
and Officer Brown told her to stand up and place her hands behind her back.
(Id.) As Officer Brown took hold of Acuna's right arm, she spun away from him
and broke free from his grip. (Id.) Acuna attempted to run for the apartment and
Officer Brown "got her to the ground in the doorway of the apartment" and told
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her to stop resisting.

(ld.) Acuna then kicked Officer Brown in the left knee,

causing his knee to "bend backwards." (Id.)
The state charged Acuna with felony battery upon a law enforcement
officer.

(R., pp.96-97.)

Pursuant to a Non-Binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement,

Acuna pled guilty to the reduced charge of misdemeanor battery. (R., pp.10919.) As part of the plea agreement, Acuna "agree[d] to pay restitution to the
victim in this matter which is not covered by workers compensation and/or
medical insurance."

(R., p.110.)

Acuna also agreed that she could not "be

discharged from probation until this restitution is paid in full." (ld.)
Acuna was sentenced by the magistrate court and a restitution hearing
was set for a later date. (R., pp.47, 121.) The state submitted a letter from the
State Insurance Fund requesting restitution in the amount of $8,989.30 for
medical expenses and time loss that it paid out on behalf of Officer Brown. (R.,
pp.2S-27.) That amount was later amended to $10,31 0.S8. (R., pp.28-30.) After
hearing oral argument, the magistrate court ordered Acuna to pay $4,SOO in
restitution to the State Insurance Fund.
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(R., pp.12S-26.)

Acuna appealed to the district court. (R., pp.1-3.) The district court found
that "the state did not breach the non-binding plea agreement by providing
restitution requests from [the State Insurance Fund]" and affirmed the magistrate
court's order of restitution. (R., p.S6.) Acuna filed a timely notice of appeal from
the district court's decision. (R., pp.S7-60.)

Officer Brown did not end up receiving any restitution because he had already
been reimbursed by his employer for his out of pocket expenses. (R., p.43.)

1
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ISSUES
Acuna states the issues on appeal as:
1.

DID THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT BREACH THE PLEA
AGREEMENT BY SEEKING RESTITUTION ON BEHALF
OF THE STATE INSURANCE FUND?

2.

DID THE LOWER COURTS ERR IN ORDERING
RESTITUTION TO THE STATE INSURANCE FUND
WHERE THE STATE VIOLATED THE PLEA AGREEMENT
BY SUBMITTING THE FUND'S CLAIM TO THE COURT?

(Appellant's brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
Has Acuna failed to demonstrate that the state breached the plea
agreement by submitting a restitution request on behalf of the State
Insurance Fund?
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ARGUMENT
Acuna Has Failed To Demonstrate That The State Breached The Plea
Agreement By Submitting A Restitution Request On Behalf Of The State
Insurance Fund
A.

Introduction
The magistrate court ordered Acuna to pay restitution to the State

Insurance Fund in the amount of $4,500 and the district court affirmed that order.
On appeal, Acuna is not challenging the amount of the restitution award.
(Appellant's brief, pp.8-13.) Instead, Acuna claims that the state breached the
plea agreement by submitting a restitution request on behalf of the State
Insurance Fund. (Appellant's brief, p.13.) Acuna has failed to establish that the
state breached the plea agreement or that the magistrate court erred in awarding
restitution to the State Insurance Fund.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision." State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709,711,184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court "examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact
and whether the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings."
DeWitt, 145 Idaho at 711, 184 P.3d at 217. "If those findings are so supported
and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed the
magistrate's decision, [the appellate court] affirm[s] the district court's decision as
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a matter of procedure."

kl (citing Losser, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758; Nicholls

v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 633 P.2d 1137 (1981)).

C.

Acuna Has Failed To Show A Breach Of The Plea Agreement
Acuna asserts the state breached the plea agreement by submitting a

restitution request on behalf of the State Insurance Fund.
pp.8-13.)
agreement.

(Appellant's brief,

However, the record does not support a claim of breach of plea
Generally, whether to order restitution, and in what amount, are

matters to be determined within the discretion of the trial court.

State v.

Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37,43 P.3d 794, 796 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Russell,
126 Idaho 38, 39, 878 P.2d 212, 213 (Ct. App. 1994). Plea agreements are
contractual in nature. State v. Lutes, 141 Idaho 911,914, 120 P.3d 299,302 (Ct.
App. 2005). Therefore, as with other types of contracts, the interpretation and
legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea agreement are matters of law
reviewed de novo.

kl Likewise, "whether a plea agreement has been breached

is a question of law to be reviewed by [the appellate court] de novo, in
accordance with contract law standards." State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, _ ,
281 P.3d 90, 92 (2012) (quoting State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 593, 595,226 P.3d
535, 537 (2010)); accord State v. Jafek 141 Idaho 71, 73, 106 P.3d 397, 399
(2005); State v. Schultz, 150 Idaho 97, 99, 244 P.3d 241, 243 (Ct. App. 2010).
In determining whether a plea agreement has been breached, the
appellate court must examine the language of the agreement at issue. Gomez,
153 Idaho at _,281 P.3d at 94 (citing Peterson, 148 Idaho at 595,226 P.3d at
537).

If the language of the agreement is ambiguous, the ambiguity must be
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resolved in favor of the defendant.

kL.

If, on the other hand, the language of a

written plea agreement is unambiguous -

i.e., not reasonably subject to

conflicting interpretations - the court "will not look beyond the four corners of the
agreement to determine the intent of the parties."

kL.

(citing Beus v. Beus, 151

Idaho 235,241,254 P.3d 1231, 1237 (2011)).
The language of the plea agreement in this case is unambiguous. The
plea agreement provides, in relevant part, that "Defendant agrees to pay
restitution to the victim in this matter which is not covered by workers
compensation and/or medical insurance. Defendant cannot be discharged from
probation until this restitution is paid in full."

(R., p.110 (emphasis added).)

Pursuant to the plain and unambiguous language of that provision, Acuna
agreed that she could not be discharged from probation until she paid restitution
to Officer Brown for his out of pocket expenses.

2

Although Acuna specifically

agreed to pay for those expenses, she was free to argue for a lesser amount
regarding any other restitution that the state sought, which is precisely what
happened in this case. The plea agreement provided the minimum amount of
restitution that Acuna was required to pay and nothing in the plea agreement
precluded the state from also seeking statutorily authorized restitution on behalf
of other victims. In other words, the plea agreement was silent on the issue of
whether the state could seek restitution on behalf of the State Insurance Fund.

The courts below ultimately determined that, despite the language in the plea
agreement stating that Acuna could not be discharged from probation until she
paid restitution to Officer Brown, Acuna could only be placed on probation for a
maximum of two years pursuant to I.C. § 19-3921. (R., pp.50-51.)

2
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This case is analogous to State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90
(2012). The defendant in Gomez pled guilty to three drug-related felonies.
_ , 281 P.3d at 91-92.

kL at

The written plea agreement called for specific

sentencing recommendations but was silent with respect to restitution.

kL

at

_,281 P.3d at 94. The district court imposed the agreed upon sentences and,
at the state's request, also ordered Gomez to pay more than $129,000 in
restitution related to the costs of investigation.

kL

at _ , 281 P.3d at 92. On

appeal, Gomez argued that, because restitution was not mentioned in the plea
agreement, the state's request for restitution and the issuance of the restitution
order constituted a breach of that agreement.

kL

The Idaho Supreme Court

disagreed, ultimately concluding that, because the plain and unambiguous
language of the written plea agreement was "silent as to the costs of restitution
or whether restitution would be sought," there was no agreement as to restitution
and, as such, no breach.

kL. at _ ,

281 P.3d at 94-95. The Court explained:

The parties could have included restitution in the written plea
agreement if they wanted the agreement to contemplate the issue.
When viewing the document within its four corners, the restitution
order did not breach the contract as the issue was not
contemplated in the plea agreement. Since the contract is clear
and unambiguous, it is unnecessary for this Court to analyze any
extrinsic evidence or to look at the intent of the parties.

kL at _ ,

281 P.3d at 95.

The reasoning of Gomez applies equally in this case and compels the
conclusion that the state did not violate the plea agreement by submitting a
restitution request on behalf of the State Insurance Fund.

Although the plea

agreement in this case did discuss restitution, it is similar to Gomez because the
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plea agreement was silent on the issue of whether the state would also be
seeking restitution on behalf of the State Insurance Fund. The plea agreement
only addressed the restitution Acuna was required to pay directly to Officer
Brown for his out of pocket costs. As such, Acuna was free to argue for a lesser
amount than the State Insurance Fund requested, but she could not contest the
restitution award for Officer Brown's out of pocket expenses.

The plea

agreement's silence as to whether restitution would be sought on behalf of the
other victim in this case did not require the state to withhold that victim's claim of
restitution from the court.
Acuna argues that "[t]he recent case of State v. Gomez, 151 Idaho 538,
261 P3d 819 (App. 2011)[3] is on point with the facts of this case." (Appellant's
brief, p.8.) Acuna then argues that based on the standard set forth in that case,
"it is clear the state breached its agreement with Acuna." (Appellant's brief, p.9.)
In that case, the Court of Appeals held that "where there exists a written plea
agreement which does not mention the issue of restitution and where the
defendant was not otherwise clearly informed on the record that restitution is part
of the agreement, it is a breach of that agreement for the state to seek
restitution."

State v. Gomez, No. 36545, 2011 WL 1085989, at *4 (Ct. App.

March 25, 2011) As discussed above, Gomez is analogous to this case because
the plea agreement here was silent on the issue of whether the state could seek

3 Acuna's citation to this case appears to mistakenly refer to State v. Peregrina,
151 Idaho 538, 261 P.3d 815 (2011). (See Appellant's brief, p.8.) However, the
direct quote Acuna relies on is from State v. Gomez, No. 36545, 2011 WL
1085989 (Ct. App. March 25, 2011).
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restitution on behalf of the State Insurance Fund. However, Acuna's reliance on
the holding in the Court of Appeals case is misplaced because that holding was
later overturned by the Idaho Supreme Court. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d
90. As such, Acuna's argument is completely meritless.
Assuming arguendo that the plea agreement was ambiguous on the issue
of restitution for the State Insurance Fund, the record fully supports the same
interpretation that is apparent from the plain language of the plea agreement.
The state's intent in agreeing to the provision in the plea agreement pertaining to
Officer Brown's out of pocket expenses was to "fully protect the direct victim,
Officer Brown." (R., p.20.) On appeal to the district court, the prosecutor stated:
Part of the reason I did the nonbinding plea agreement with
Mr. Larsen was with regard to making sure that Officer Brown was,
for certain, going to get restitution if he had any out-of-pocket
expense, but there was the understanding that there might be
above and beyond, especially when we continued this a number of
times due to Officer Brown having to do physical therapy, which
then did not benefit him and he ended up going into surgery.
(1/23/12 Tr., p.29, Ls.16-25.)

Acuna's attorney indicated that his intent in

drafting the provision was to limit the restitution that Acuna was required to pay
prior to being discharged from probation.

(1/23/12 Tr., p.34, Ls.3-6, 20-22.)

Accordingly, the plea agreement guaranteed that Officer Brown would be paid in
full for his out of pocket expenses and it ensured that Acuna could be discharged
from probation after she paid that restitution.
Acuna's attorney "thought" he told the prosecutor "if there is any more
than [out of pocket expenses] for [Officer Brown's] injuries," the State Insurance
Fund would "certainly have the right to sue [Acuna] civilly" (1/23/12 Tr., p.33,
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L.24 - p.34, L.3.) However, the plea agreement said nothing about eliminating
the State Insurance Fund's right to seek restitution and forcing it to seek a civil
judgment instead.

Neither the plain language of the plea agreement, nor the

other evidence in the record, supports Acuna's contention that the state was
somehow precluded from submitting a request for restitution on behalf of the
State Insurance Fund.
The non-binding Rule 11 plea agreement is unambiguous.

Because

nothing therein prohibited the state from submitting a restitution request from the
State Insurance Fund, the state did not breach the plea agreement by submitting
the letter setting forth the expenses that were paid on behalf of Officer Brown.
Acuna received significant benefits from the plea agreement by having the felony
battery upon a law enforcement officer charge reduced to misdemeanor battery
and by retaining the right to argue for a lesser restitution amount on anything
above Officer Brown's out of pocket expenses. She did just that (7/12/11 Tr.,
p.4, Ls.18-23; p.7, Ls.15-22), and the magistrate court reduced the amount that
she owed to the State Insurance Fund from $10,310.58 to $4,500 (R., pp.12526). Acuna has failed to show that the state breached the plea agreement and
the award of restitution to the State Insurance Fund should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court and
magistrate.
DATED this 28th day of September 2012.

M.GRAY
D puty Attorney G
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